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INTRODUCTION 
The briefs of the Respondents/Appellees make no new 
arguments about the propriety of the Order of the Public Service 
Commission ("Commission") subject to this appeal. The Commission 
sua sponte purported to bifurcate the issues before it into two 
cases, i.e., (1) whether the sale of White City Water Company 
("White City') to Sandy City ("Sandy") is in the public interest 
and should be approved (which retained the original docketing No. 
91-018-01); and (2) whether the Commission would retain 
jurisdiction to regulate rates of non-Sandy customers after the 
sale (which was assigned a new docketing No. 91-018-02) . The issue 
whether the sale is in the public interest, docket No. 91-018-01, 
remains before the Commission. In order to resolve this issue, 
Sandy and White City requested the Commission to schedule 
proceeding concerning the sale.1 Appellants ask the Court to take 
notice of the proceedings to the extent they bear on issues 
relevant to this appeal. 
1
 Pursuant to Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, Appellants respectfully 
request that this Court take judicial notice of the proceedings currently in progress before 
the Commission with respect to White City's application. This court may take judicial 
notice of proceedings having a direct relation to a matter before it Wohlschlegel v. 
Uhlmann-Kihei, Inc., 662 P.2d 505, 508 n.l (Haw. Ct. App. 1983); Holguin v. Aetna 
Casualty & Sur. Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 918, 920 n.l (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). 
Pursuant to Rule 201(d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, in separate Appendix, 
Appellants have supplied the Court with the testimony filed in the proceedings necessary 
for the Court to take judicial notice of these proceedings. 
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STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS 
1. On January 27, 1993, the Commission issued a 
scheduling order in the Application of White City which states that 
"the Commission is willing to consider alternatives to full 
jurisdiction that will protect the interests of retail water 
customers outside municipal boundaries and still allow the sale of 
White City to proceed." The order directs White City and Sandy to 
"file testimony, exhibits and work papers, including any cost-of-
service studies, supporting their position that the sale would 
benefit the public interest and a clear explanation of why it 
cannot afford us any intelligence on resolving the non-residents' 
concerns without going through the public interest portion of the 
hearing." Order of the Public Service Commission dated January 27, 
1993, Appendix Tab A at p.2. 
2. Sandy and White City filed testimony and exhibits in 
support of its contention that it is in the public interest to 
approve the sale of the stock of White City to the Building 
Authority. The testimony and esxhibits filed by Sandy and White 
City support the following propositions: (a) that among Sandy's 
reasons for acquiring White City is provision of a safe, stable 
water system for present and future residents (Testimony of Darrell 
Scow, Director of Public Works for Sandy City, before the Public 
Service Commission, Appendix Tab B at p. 3); (b) that Sandy is in 
the best position to provide such a water system (Scow Testimony, 
id. at pp. 3-4) ; (c) that current rates for non-resident water 
users are cost derived (Scow Testimony, id. at pp. 6-7; Siegel 
47453 2 
Study attached at Tab B, number 3); (d) that non-resident water 
users are proportionally represented on the Sandy City Water board 
(Scow Testimony, id. at p. 8); and (e) that Sandy can make needed 
capital improvements to White City at less cost to its users (Scow 
Testimony of Steven R. McFarland before the Public Service 
Commission, Appendix Tab C at pp. 7-8). 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COMMISSION'S ORDER IS NOT A FINAL ORDER 
The Commission's Order, which is the subject of this 
appeal, deals only with the issue of whether the Commission would 
retain jurisdiction to regulate rates if the sale between White 
City Water Company and the Sandy City Municipal Building Authority 
is approved. The Commission did not take evidence or conduct a 
hearing concerning whether approval of the sale would be in the 
public interest. Instead, after briefing by the parties on the 
issue of jurisdiction, the Commission purported to severe the 
jurisdictional issue from the case by assigning it a different 
docketing number. The Commission announced its decision on the 
jurisdiction issue and declared that the order was a final order. 
A. ISSUES IN THIS CASE REMAIN UNRESOLVED BEFORE THE 
COMMISSION. 
It is axiomatic that, for purposes of appeal, a final 
order ends litigation and leaves no claim remaining for resolution. 
Tippets v. Page Petroleum, Inc.. 738 P.2d 635 (Utah 1987). Parties 
are entitled to only one appeal as a matter of right and only after 
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entry of final judgment that concludes the action. Pate v. 
Marathon Steel Co., 292 P.2d 765 (Utah 1984) . In this instance the 
Commission has not addressed the central issue of approving the 
sale of White City. It has decided only a condition to the 
contract of sale# i.e.# the jurisdiction of the Commission. The 
query here is whether bifurcating issues in a case makes an order 
regarding one issue a final order for purposes of appeal. 
Appellees have not addressed the clear ruling set out in 
Public Utilities Commission v. Poudre Valley Rural Elec. Ass'n. 173 
Col. 364, 366, 480 P.2d 106 (Colo. 1970) holding that simply 
assigning separate docket numbers does not make separate cases. In 
Poudre Valley, the court stated that "unless and until an 
administrative matter is reduced to a final judgment, settling all 
the issues between the parties, we will not review it. The 
assignment of separate numbers by the Commission to its decisions 
dealing with different phases of the same proceeding did not create 
two separate proceedings." Id. at 108. In the Poudre Valley case, 
the Public Utilities Commission argued that one decision made by 
the Commission was final and should have been appealed before a 
second decision was entered. The Court dismissed this reasoning 
stating that the first order wcis an interlocutory, rather than a 
final order, as it was "merely a part of the continuing litigation 
on this problem." Id. None of the appellees address the ruling in 
Poudre Valley or give separate authority supporting the notion that 
a commission can make an order final by assigning a new docket 
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number to it. Clearly, the Commission's Order lacks finality and 
should be dismissed. 
Furthermore, when other issues remain below, the 
appellate court allows review only under the standards set out in 
the Rules of Civil or Appellate Procedure. Neither the standards 
set out in Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, nor the 
granting of a petition under Rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, have been satisfied in this instance. The appellees 
argue that "the Commission made a final, appealable decision on the 
issue of jurisdiction to regulate Sandy.11 Joint Brief, at 25. No 
authority or discussion supports this assertion. Similarly, Salt 
Lake County argues that the Commission's Order is final because 
"the Commission assigned a separate docket number (91-018-0-02) to 
that portion of its order declaring it has jurisdiction over 
Sandy's sale of water to non-residents." Salt Lake County Brief, 
at 22. None of the appellees explain why issues remaining before 
the Commission relating to the sale of White City to Sandy are not 
integral to the jurisdictional issue. Further, the appellees do 
not explain how an order can be final where issues between the 
parties in the litigation remain before the Commission. As noted 
in Sloan v. Board of Review. 781 P.2d 463 (Utah Ct. App. 463) "an 
order of [an] agency is not final so long as it reserves something 
to the agency for further decision." Sloan. 781 P.2d at 464. 
The current proceedings before the Commission concerning 
approval of White City's application may resolve some of the 
Commission's concerns about future regulation and may require the 
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Commission to revise assumptions on which it based the Order. 
Among these assumptions are Sandy's reasons for acquiring White 
City, whether a higher rate for non-Sandy users is justified on a 
cost basis, and whether White City could finance needed 
improvements. The Commission implicitly relied on assumptions 
about those issues when it executed its Order. However, there is 
no factual basis for those assumptions and the Commission is 
currently hearing evidence to resolve those issues. Certainly, 
even the fact that the Commission is now taking evidence 
underscores the lack of finality in this matter. All of the 
reasons for lack of finality set out in Kennecott Corp. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 1099, 1104 (Utah 1991), apply in this 
instance and the matter should be remanded to the Commission for 
all issues to be determined. 
In sum, the Commission has not created, and cannot 
create, two separate matters in this case. The initial issue of 
White City's application remains before the Commission. Thus, 
until the issue of approval of the Agreement between Appellants is 
resolved, the Commission's Order regarding jurisdiction is not a 
final order. 
B. UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT (#UAPA") DOES 
NOT PROVIDE STANDARDS FOR PINAL ORDERS. 
Appellees are correct in arguing that the Commission 
is governed by the provisions of UAPA when conducting hearings and 
other administrative proceedings. UAPA, however, does not include 
a provision that creates a standard for determining whether an 
order from the Commission is final or non-final. Statutes and case 
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law determine finality. For example, in Sloan v. Board of Review, 
the Utah Court of Appeals stated that w [CL] n appeal can be taken 
only from entry of a final judgment which wholly disposes of a 
claim against a party." Id. at 464 (internal quotation and 
citation omitted) .2 Where claims remain, the decision is not final 
for purposes of appeal. 
C. THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ISSUING A FINAL 
ORDER HAVE NOT BEEN SATISFIED 
Salt Lake County argues that the Commission's Order is 
final because the Commission complied with Utah Admin. R. 750-100-
11(C).3 County Brief at 23. The County also argues that the 
Commission's Order is final because Section 54-7-10(1) of the Utah 
Code provides that orders of the Commission "shall take effect and 
become operative on the date issued." County Brief at 23. The 
arguments fail because neither statute provides standard by which 
a court may determine whether an order is final or non-final. 
D. THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW IS IRRELEVANT TO 
A DETERMINATION OF THE FINALITY OF THE COMMISSION'S 
ORDER AND, EVEN ASSUMING THAT IT IS RELEVANT, THE 
2
 Salt Lake County contends that "[t]he holding of Sloan is distinguishable under 
the facts of the present case . . . ." SLC Brief, at 24. Petitioners disagree with Salt Lake 
County's contention. Regardless of whether the ultimate holding of Sloan is factually 
distinguishable from the instant case, however, it is clear that the finality standard applied 
in Sloan is the appropriate standard to be applied in judicial review of orders from 
administrative agencies. 
3
 Utah Admin. R. 746-100-ll(C) provides as follows: 
If a case has been heard by the full Commission, it shall confer following the 
hearing. Upon reaching its decision, the Commission shall draft or direct the 
drafting of a report and order, as provided above, which upon signature at 
least two Commissioners, shall become the order of the Commission. 
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APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW IN THIS CASE IS DE 
NOVO REVIEW 
Appellees argue that the appropriate standard of review 
in this case is the "whole record" or "substantial evidence" 
standard of review under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46-b-16(4)(g) (1989 & 
Supp. 1992).4 However, the Commission refused to accept evidence 
or hear testimony concerning the application before it. 
Accordingly, the Commission's decision involves an interpretation 
of its statutory powers and authority which is a question of law, 
not a question of fact as argued by Appellees. Bevans v. 
Industrial Comm'n. 790 P.2d 573 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). See also 
MCI v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 186 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (1992) (questions 
of law are reviewable under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d)). In 
MCI, this Court made it clear that issues reviewable under Section 
63-46b-16(4) (d) are subject to de novo review. MCI. 186 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 10. 
Furthermore, this Court, as well as the Utah Court of 
Appeals, has repeatedly held that appellate courts reviewing agency 
determinations involving questions of law under Section 63-46b-
4
 This provision states, in pertinent part: 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been sub-
stantially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determi-
nation of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not 
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light 
of the whole record before the c o u r t . . . . 
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8(1) (d) are to give no deference to the agency's decision. Ouestar 
Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 817 P.2d 316 (Utah 1991); 
Morton Int'l. Inc. v. Auditing Div.. 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991); 
Savage Indus.. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 
1991) . Thus, Appellees' contention that de novo review is not 
appropriate in this case is without merit. 
II. 
THE COMMISSION'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
CONSTITUTES A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS AND A VIOLATION OF 
THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT 
The Commission acted improperly by bifurcating the issue 
of jurisdiction from the approval of White City's Application 
because the Commission does not have the power to make decisions 
sua sponte on issues not raised by the parties. In Chevron v. Utah 
State Tax Commission, 207 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Utah Ct. App., January 
29, 1993), the Court of Appeals agreed with Chevron that it was 
"improper for the Commission sua sponte to raise and decide an 
issue that had not been raised by the parties." Id. at 24. The 
Court cited Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc.. 680 P. 2d 733 
(Utah 1984) which states "a trial court has no authority to render 
a decision on issues not presented for determination." Combe at 
736. Here the Commission had no authority sua sponte to bifurcate 
the issues in White City's application when bifurcation was not 
requested by any party and the issue was not addressed by any 
party. Sandy and White City were taken by surprise when the 
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Commission determined to take this novel route. Clearly, adequate 
notice and an opportunity to object to the process were missing. 
In addition, under the Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-0.5 to 63-46b-22 (1989 & Supp. 1992), 
the Commission must follow certain procedures in conducting formal 
adjudicative proceedings. Section 63-46b-8 provides that in all5 
administrative hearings associated with formal adjudicative 
proceedings, n[t]he presiding officer shall afford to all parties 
the opportunity to present evidence, argue, respond, conduct cross-
examination, and submit rebuttal evidence. Id. at § 63-46b-
8(1) (d) . 
The Commission's Order was issued without holding an 
evidentiary hearing despite objections by White City and Sandy. 
Indeed, before a hearing was held on the approval of the Agreement 
between Sandy and White City and the jurisdictional question raised 
by this agreement, the Commission had already drafted the Order at 
issue and informed the parties that it would retain jurisdiction if 
the agreement were approved. Although the Commission informed the 
parties that they could attempt to change the Commission's mind 
through oral argument, the Commission did not allow the parties to 
present any evidence. 
Salt Lake County attempts to rationalize and legitimize 
the Commission's denial of the parties' rights to due process, and 
5
 Section 63-46b-8(l) states that the procedures outlined in the rest of Section 
8 apply to all formal adjudicative proceedings except as provided in Subsection 63-46b3(d)(i) 
and (ii). The exceptions enumerated in Sections 63-46b-3(d)(i) and (ii) do not apply to the 
instant case. 
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the Commission's violation of UAPA# by cLrguing that a factual 
hearing was not necessary because the record contains sufficient 
uncontroverted facts to support the Commission's decision. County 
Brief at 20. Similarly, the Commission and White City Water Users 
attempt to legalize the Commission's actions by noting that the 
Commission's decision was based upon legal and factual evidence, in 
the form of legal memoranda and briefs, received from all parties. 
Joint Brief, at 22. In this regard, Salt Lake County asks this 
Court to interpret Bunnell v. Industrial Comm'n, 740 P.2d 1331, 
1333 (Utah 1987) (every person who brings a claim before an 
administrative agency has a due process right to a fair trial) and 
R.W. Jones Trucking. Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n, 649 P.2d 628 
(Utah 1982) (due process includes notice and opportunity to be 
heard and defend) as holding that every person who brings a claim 
before an administrative agency has a due process right to receive 
a fair trial, including notice and an opportunity to be heard, 
unless the administrative agency independently determines that a 
fair trial and due process are not necessary. Or more absurdly, 
that if the Commission determines, in its discretion, that a 
hearing is not necessary in light of the legal memoranda, documen-
tation and briefs filed by the parties, it need not be held. 
However, this Court used absolute language in Bunnell, 
guaranteeing that individuals appearing before the Commission hold 
the right to due process without any exceptions. This rule is 
reiterated in Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney. 818 P.2d 23, 28 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (it is clear abuse of discretion for an 
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administrative body to conduct proceedings in a way to deny due 
process). Furthermore, the Utah legislature clearly expressed its 
intent that the Commission's adherence to UAPA be mandatory, and 
not discretionary, by stating that n[t]he presiding officer shall 
afford to all parties" the rights outlined in Section 8. Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-8(l) (d) (1989) . The Utah Court of Appeals recognized 
the mandatory nature of UAPA in D.B. v. Division of Occupational 
and Professional Licensing. 779 P.2d 1145 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), in 
which the Court held that the plaintiff social worker's due process 
rights were violated by an administrative law judge who failed to 
provide the plaintiff with the opportunity to cross-examine an 
adversarial witness at a hearing concerning revocation of the 
plaintiff's license to practice. 
In sum, the Commission must comply with the Constitution-
al mandates of due process and the requirements of UAPA in all 
situations except those specifically enumerated by the courts and 
the legislature, none which are relevant in this case. In the 
instant case, notice and an evidentiary hearing would have allowed 
the parties to present facts and evidence demonstrating that 
approval of the proposed transaction would be in the public 
interest. More importantly, an evidentiary hearing would have 
given the Commission, and this Court, the factual basis on which to 
determine the constitutionality of the Commission's exercise of 
jurisdiction. Thus, notwithstanding Appellees' arguments to the 
contrary, the Commission's refusal to allow an evidentiary hearing 
violated the parties' rights to due process and violated the 
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provisions of UAPA, all to the substantial prejudice of Appellants. 
Consequently, Appellants are entitled to the judicial relief 
requested in this appeal. 
III. 
THE COMMISSION HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER MUNIC-
IPAL WATER SALES. 
The issue before this Court is the extent of the 
Commission's jurisdiction over sales of water by a municipality. 
Specifically, the Appellants challenge the Commission's conclusion 
that it "would retain jurisdiction to regulate rates charged the 
extra-territorial retail customers . . . " Commission Report and 
Order, pg. 15. The Appellees have avoided the straightforward 
analysis applicable to that narrow question.6 Instead, the 
Appellees have argued "facts" of their own making, supposedly 
supported by a record devoid of any evidence and the policy reasons 
6
 The citations to White River Shale Oil v. Public Service Commission, 700 P.2d 1088 
(Utah 1985) and Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 682 P.2d 858 (Utah 
1984) in the Joint Brief do not support the Commission's extension of jurisdiction because 
jurisdiction was not an issue in either case. Similarly, City of Orangeburg v. Moss, 204 
S.E.2d 377 (S.C. 1974), does not support extension of the Commission's power because the 
case does not deal explicitly with a "ripper" clause exception and because, in that case, the 
Commission had statutory authority to regulate. 
Respondents' citation to North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water & Irrigation 
Company, 223 P.2d 577 (Utah 1950), for the proposition that continuing regulation by the 
Commission is an "obligation" that would remain with White City after its sale to Sandy is 
similarly inapposite. County Brief at 19; Joint Brief at 10. In North Salt Lake the court 
found that while the town took the water company with binding obhgations (to serve certain 
customers) from prior Commission orders, the obhgations did not include continuing 
regulation by the Public Utilities Commission. 
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why the commission's jurisdiction should be allowed based on those 
hypothetical facts. Policy hyperbole, however, cannot substitute 
for a lack of statutory jurisdiction. Hypothetical facts cannot be 
the basis for disregarding the constitutional protection accorded 
municipalities against interference by special commissions under 
the West Jordan balancing test, even assuming it applies, since 
that case certainly requires a full evidentiary hearing in order to 
balance the interests. 
A. ONLY A FACTUAL HEARING CAN DETERMINE WHETHER 
SANDY'S SERVICE OF WATER TO NON-RESIDENT WHITE CITY 
USERS IS SALE OF SURPLUS WATER AND INCIDENT TO 
SERVICE TO SANDY'S RESIDENTS. 
Case law has consistently held that the Commission may 
not regulate cities selling water to non-residents. In Salt Lake 
County vs. Salt Lake City. 570 P.2d. 119 (Utah 1977), the County 
asked this Court for a declaratory order that the City's 
distribution system was so extensive it should be deemed to be in 
the business of selling water and, therefore, subject to regulation 
by the Commission. Utah's Supreme Court clearly recognized that a 
city's "business in furnishing water to its residents and 
activities reasonably incident thereto, is not subject to regula-
tion by the Commission." Id. at 121-122. In dicta following this 
holding, the court noted that the extent to which "a city may 
engage in rendering a utility service outside city limits without 
being subject to some public regulation is not so clearly 
determined." Id. This dicta, however, does not give the 
Commission authority to retain jurisdiction in this case. At most, 
Salt Lake County directs the Commission to conduct evidentiary 
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hearings to determine the extent of surplus sales, not to establish 
jurisdiction. 
Here Appellees' argument that Scindy's sale of water to 
current White City water users would constitute a general business 
rather than being incidental to furnishing water to its residents 
has no factual support. The Commission's Order states that among 
the "salient considerations" are its "doubts that service outside 
the city boundaries would constitute exercise of a municipal 
function." The Order also states the Commission's "skepticism 
that Sandy would be selling surplus water." Commission Report and 
Order at p. 4, emphasis added. However, nowhere does the Order set 
out even a scintilla of evidence that the prospective sale is not 
incident to Sandy's service to its own customers or any criteria to 
determine what is "surplus" water. 
Similarly, Appellees assert, without legal or factual 
support, that the sale of water by Sandy to non-resident White City 
water users would not be "surplus" water because the sale would be 
to already existing customers. Appellees further argue that if the 
water was "surplus" Sandy would not be obligated or required to 
sell such water for the long term and, therefore, the water users 
would have no guarantee of continued future service. These 
arguments do not address the legal issue of whether the Commission 
has authority to regulate. 
Meanwhile, White City and Sandy are in the process of 
setting forth facts before the Commission concerning the sale of 
White City to Sandy. The hearings will include evidence that the 
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sale of water to non-residential users is incidental to Sandy's 
water delivery system, that such sale is of surplus water, and that 
proposed rates are reasonable in light of costs. Only after the 
Commission has had the opportunity to evaluate the testimony and 
studies presented to it, will the issue whether sale of water is 
incident to Sandy's municipal functions have some factual basis and 
this court have a record to review. 
B. SANDY'S SALE OF WATER TO NON-RESIDENT WHITE CITY 
USERS IS A LOCAL MATTER CONSTITUTING A MUNICIPAL 
FUNCTION. 
Appellees rely on City of West Jordan v. Utah State 
Retirement Board. 767 P.2d. 530 (Utah 1988), and Utah Associated 
Municipal Power Systems v. Commission of Utah, ("UAMPS") 789 P.2d. 
298 (Utah 1990) to argue that the Commission should have jurisdic-
tion over Sandy's delivery of water outside its boundaries. It is 
not clear that the analysis set out in those cases applies to water 
utilities. This Court has twice been asked to rule that cities 
selling water to non-residents should be regulated by the Commis-
sion. In County Water System, Inc. v. Salt Lake City. 3 Utah 2d 
46, 278 P.2d 285 (1954) and Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City. 570 
P.2d 1191 (Utah 1977), this Court clearly stated that cities 
selling surplus water outside their boundaries are not regulated by 
the Commission. However, even if the analysis set out in City of 
West Jordan and UAMPS applies in this instance, the Commission did 
not apply the balancing test announced in these cases. In UAMPS. 
a number of municipalities planned to establish an electrical 
system to supply electricity over a large territory. Under § 11-
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13-27, Utah Code Ann., such a system must apply for and receive a 
certificate of convenience and necessity from the Commission. The 
Commission, after extensive hearings, found that the system would 
have duplicated existing lines and generated excess electricity. 
The Supreme Court, noting that the electrical system extended far 
beyond any single city, held that the proposed electrical system 
went beyond any municipal function and, therefore, the statute 
granting jurisdiction to the Commission to regulate such a system 
would be constitutional. No such balancing test was ever done in 
this instance. The appellees simply conclude, without analysis, 
that "the sale of water to non-residents involves more of a state 
regulatory interest than an exclusive local interest and is 
sufficient to avoid the characterization of a municipal function." 
County Brief at 18. Such a conclusory statement, based on no 
factual analysis, and in light of the close alignment of Sandy's 
and White City's water systems demonstrates the Commission's 
failure to apply even a minimal UAMPS analysis. Clearly, the 
Commission cannot simultaneously deny White City and Sandy the 
opportunity to put on evidence and rely on the fact-intensive 
analysis required by City of West Jordan and UAMPS. The Order 
should be dismissed and the matter remanded to the Commission for 
findings. 
CONCLUSION 
Salt Lake County, the Commission and White City Water 
Users ask this Court to affirm an Order that is not final, that 
violates the basic standards of due process, and that is in direct 
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contravention to existing constitutional, statutory and case law. 
In contrast, White City and Sandy ask the Court to overrule the 
Order and to remand the matter to the Commission. White City and 
Sandy ask the Court to direct the Commission to resolve all the 
issues before it and to give White City and Sandy an opportunity to 
present their evidence to make an appropriate record. 
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63-46b-8. Procedures for formal adjudicat ive 
,*i i? P r o c e c d i n R » — Hearing procedure. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3(d)(i) 
and (n), m all formal adjudicative proceedings, a 
hearing shall be conducted as follows: 
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the 
course of the hearing to obtain full disclosure of 
relevant facte and to afford all the parties reason-
able opportunity to present their positions. 
(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a 
party, the presiding officer. 
(i) may exclude evidence that is irrele-
vant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious; 
(ii) shall exclude evidence privileged in 
the courts of Utah; 
(iii) may receive documentary evidence in 
the form of a copy or excerpt if the copy or 
excerpt contains all pertinent portions of the 
original document; 
(iv) may take official notice of any facte 
that could be judicially noticed under the 
Utah Rules of Evidence, of the record of 
other proceedings before the agency, and of 
technical or scientific facte within the 
agency's specialized knowledge. 
(c) The presiding officer may not exclude evi-
dence solely because it is hearsay. 
(d) The presiding officer shall afford to all par-
ties the opportunity to present evidence, argue, 
respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit 
rebuttal evidence. 
(e) The presiding officer may give persons not 
a party to the adjudicative proceeding the oppor-
tunity to present oral or written statements at 
the hearing. 
(f) All testimony presented at the hearing, if 
offered as evidence to be considered in reaching a 
decision on the merits, shall be given under oath. 
(g) The hearing shall be recorded at the 
agency's expense. 
(h) Any party, at his own expense, may have a 
person approved by the agency prepare a tran-
script of the hearing, subject to any restrictions 
that the agency is permitted by statute to impose 
to protect confidential information disclosed at 
the hearing. 
d) All hearings shall be open to all parties. 
(2) This section does not preclude the presiding of-
ficer from taking appropriate measures necessary to 
preserve the integrity of the heanng. 1988 
63-46b-l& Judicial review — Formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or 
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all 
final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency ac-
tion resulting from formal adjudicative proceed-
ings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review 
of agency action with the appropriate appellate 
court in the form required by the appellate rules 
of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate ap-
pellate court shall govern all additional filings 
and proceedings in the appellate court 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the 
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudica-
tive proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may 
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the 
record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of pre-
paring transcripts and copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably re-
fuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of 
law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on 
which the agency action is based, is unconstitu. 
tional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdic-
tion conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues 
requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful pro. 
cedure or decision-making process, or has failed 
to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were 
illegally constituted as a decision-making body 
or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determi-
nation of fact, made or implied by the agency, 
that is not supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record before 
the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to 
the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
dii) contrary to the agency's prior prac-
tice, unless the agency justifies the inconsis-
tency by giving facts and reasons that dem-
onstrate a fair and rational basis for the in-
consistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 1968 
